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ENERGY LAW
Natural gasprorationing v. take-or-pay:
The risk-shifting battle continues
by Gary D. Allison




Argument Date Nov. 29,1988
ISSUES
Section 1 (b) of the Natural Gas Act of 1938 gives the
states exclusive jurisdiction over the natural gas production
and gathering activities within their borders. In this case, the
Supreme Court will decide whether state-ordered produc-
tion limits on natural gas wells unconstitutionally Interfere
with federal authority to regulate the gas acquisition and
sales practices of Interstate pipe lines.
Such production limits could confront interstate pipe
lines with the choice of purchasing more gas than they
currently desire, or suffering a reduction in the ultimate
volume of gas they may acquire from the wells covered by
their gas-purchase contracts.
The Court must decide whether these potential impacts
on interstate pipe lines 1) violate the supremacy clause by
interfering with the exclusive authority of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission to regulate the gas acquisition and
sales practices of interstate pipe lines and to control the
abandonment of natural gas dedicated to interstate com-
merce, or 2) Impose impermissible burdens on interstate
commerce in violation of the commerce clause.
FACTS
Like many gas-producing states, Kansas has established a
gas prorationing system as a part of its gas conservation
program. Under this system, the Kansas Corporation Com-
mission (KCC) sets production limits, called allowables, for
each well in certain gas fields. This case arises out of a
dispute concerning how Kansas handles the drainage caused
by some wells failing to produce at their allowable levels.
Kansas' gas prorationing system permits producers whose
wells fall to recover their allowables to accumulate the
underage for possible recovery In the future. This underage
may be recovered in the future If the well involved becomes
capable of producing in excess of Its allowable. Then, the
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KCC will permit the well to produce over Its allowable until
the accumulated underage is recovered, provided that the
recovery occurs over a reasonable period of time.
Kansas does impose a limit on the right of producers to
accumulate and recover underage. The limit equals six times
the allowable set for the well during the January prorationing
preceding the well's decline into underage status. Once this
limit is reached, no further underage may be accumulated
and any excess underage is cancelled.
Prior to Feb. 16, 1983, Kansas would restore their can-
celled underage anytime upon a showing that the wells
Involved "are in an over-produced status; that the purchaser
is willing and able to take the amounts of gas; and that the
length of time proposed by the applicant for the production
of the amount of gas to be reinstated is reasonable under the
circumstances." See paragraph (p) of the 1944 Basic Prora-
tion Order.
On Feb. 16, 1983, the KCC put time limits on the right to
recover cancelled underage. Under the new reinstatement
rule, cancelled underage will not be reinstated unless the
producer seeks reinstatement within three years of the can-
cellation. Reinstated underage must be fully recovered with-
in five years of the reinstatement. Thus, for the first time,
Kansas may permanently cancel all or part of a producer's
excess underage.
Wells suffering permanent cancellation of excess under-
age might recover less gas over their production lives,
because allowables are set In part to give producers a fair
opportunity to recover the gas originally beneath their gas
properties (the acreage in which they own drilling rights).
When a well produces below its allowable level, the flow
of gas in Its direction may be reduced so much that the gas
property on which It is located may be drained by wells that
are producing at the allowable level on surrounding gas
properties. To regain the volume of gas so drained, it is
necessary to create a reverse flow of gas strong enough to
drain the surrounding properties even though the wells
thereon are producing at the allowable level.
Therefore, owners of gas properties that have suffered
drainage during times of underage accumulation may never
recover their fair share of gas If their wells are never permit-
ted to produce in excess of assigned allowables.
A well cannot produce gas for which there is no purchas-
er, since, unlike oil, natural gas cannot be stored economical-
ly. Often, a well accumulates underage because of a reduc-
tion in purchases by those who have contracted to purchase
its output. Under Kansas' new cancellation of underage
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policy, purchasers of gas from wells that face permanent
cancellation of underage may have to Increase their pur-
chases sooner than they desire In order to avoid the possibili-
ty that these wells will suffer a reduction in ultimate recovery.
Northwest Central Pipeline Corp., an interstate pipe line,
alleges that the KCC's new cancellation policy will force It to
buy gas it does not need to avoid a reduction in the ultimate
recovery of gas from the Kansas wells from which it has
contracted to purchase gas. Northwest argues that this "use it
or lose it" choice violates the supremacy clause by impeding
the exclusive authority of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission to regulate the cost structures of interstate pipe
lines and to control the abandonment of natural gas dedicat-
ed to interstate commerce.
Finally, Northwest contends that the new cancellation
policy violates the commerce clause to the extent it causes
gas dedicated to interstate commerce to be drained away into
intrastate commerce.
Northwest's allegations were rejected by the District
Court of Gray County, Kan., on Nov. 7, 1983, and by the
Kansas Supreme Court on May 10, 1985. On Feb. 24, 1986,
the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case back to the
Kansas Supreme Court for consideration of whether the
opinion in Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil
& Gas Bd., 474 U.S. 409 (1986) (known as "Transco')
compels a different result.
The Kansas Supreme Court reaffirmed Its earlier opinion
on Feb. 20, 1987. The Kansas courts essentially held that the
KCC's cancellation policy constitutes regulation of produc-
tion, over which the states have exclusive jurisdiction, and
that this regulation has only an incidental impact on inter-
state commerce. In Its second opinion, the Kansas Supreme
Court distinguished this case from Transco, reasoning that
Transco involved state restraints on purchasers and purchas-
ing practices while this case concerns state restraints on
producers and production practices.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
The goals of the Kansas gas conservation system are to
prevent the physical waste of gas resources that might occur
if gas is produced from a reservoir in unbalanced drainage
patterns, and to provide producers with afair opportunity to
recover all the gas originally located beneath their gas
properties. Given the design of its conservation system,
Kansas must rely on certain market incentives. To under-
stand why, you need to know the basic mechanics of natural
gas production and the Kansas conservation system.
Before it Is penetrated by a well, a natural gas reservoir
possesses pressure, the force of which Is in part determined
by the volume of gas and the capacity of the reservoir. When
a well is drilled Into a natural gas reservoir, the well bore
releases the reservoir pressure and provides room for gas to
expand. Gas expands from high pressure areas toward low
pressure areas.
The combination of pressure release and gas expansion
causes natural gas to migrate toward the well bore, thereby
enabling producers to capture the gas through their wells.
Over time, the depletion of gas will reduce the reservoir
pressure and hence the production capability of each well.
If a gas reservoir is sufficiently large, one well will not be
capable of draining it because the reservoir pressure will
eventually become insufficient to move the gas that is
farthest from the well to the well bore. When the first well
can no longer produce, gas is left behind unless another well
can be drilled in a location positioned to capture it.
The remaining recoverable gas will be left in the ground
permanently if its volume is too small to make the drilling of
a second well economical. This situation, called physical
waste, will arise If the gas remaining in the reservoir lies in a
pattern so skewed by migration toward the first well that a
second well cannot recover enough of It to be profitable.
The Kansas gas conservation system is designed to com-
bine with normal market incentives to encourage the bal-
anced drainage patterns necessary for reducing the physical
waste of natural gas. Spacing rules limit the number of wells
drilled Into a reservoir roughly on the basis of how many
acres a well can efficiently drain. Despite the spacing rules,
gas wells in Kansas often drain gas properties adjacent to
those on which they are located. To help ensure that such
drainage does not become unbalanced to the point of
causing waste, Kansas Implements a gas prorationing system.
Under this system, the KCC sets production allowables by
using a formula with three major variables. First, the KCC
estimates the market demand for the field twice a year from
purchaser nominations and data reflecting "the reasonable
current requirements for current consumption and use with-
in and without the state and such other factors, conditions, or
circumstances that would aid in establishing the market
demand." Kans. Stat. § 55-703.
Second, the KCC calculates the acreage attributable to
each well, which usually is set at 640 acres per well. Third,
the KCC determines each well's capacity to produce in
absence of production limits. This capacity to produce,
called deliverability, is determined by pressure tests.
From the foregoing factors, the KCC calculates the pro-
duction allowables, assigning a share of the estimated market
demand. The allowables are essentially based on the ratio of
each well's acreage and deliverability to the sum of the
acreage and deliverability, of all the wells in the field. Such
allowables permit each well, at least In theory, to achieve a
production rate at which-given its production capacity, its
location in relation to other wells, and the other wells'
allowables-the flow of natural gas toward it will be suffi-
cient to keep other wells from draining the gas property on
which it is located.
Thus, gas is prevented from migrating out of the produc-
tion range of the wells best positioned to capture It and
toward wells that can never capture It because they are too far
away.
This type of prorationing best prevents unbalanced drain-
age when all producers In a reservoir drill their wells within a
fairly short period of time and thereafter operate them at the
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allowable level as continuously as possible. In the real world,
gas reservoirs are not depleted in such an orderly manner. A
well may undergo periods of low or no production due to
either mechanical problems or the reduced takes of those
who purchase gas from it. As a consequence, Kansas' gas
prorationing scheme leaves open the possibility that gas will
drain from one gas property to another.
Until recently, Kansas assumed that normal market incen-
tives would induce producers to bring the production rates
of their underproduced wells back to allowable levels as
soon as possible. In recent years, however, market incentives
have been skewed by a combination of factors, including the
effects of phased deregulation of natural gas wellhead prices
on the purchasing practices of interstate pipe lines.
Specifically, after enduring artificial shortages caused by
wellhead prices being regulated at levels too low to induce
producers to sell gas in interstate gas markets, interstate pipe
lines reacted to deregulation by contracting to purchase, at
historically high prices, massive volumes of deregulated gas
supplies on a take-or-pay basis. The high purchase costs have
combined with a virtual collapse of world oil prices to cause
demand for natural gas at the burner tip to fall drastically.
The gas shortage has become a gas surplus, and interstate
pipe lines have for at least seven years been forced by their
take-or-pay contracts to buy gas for which they no longer
have markets. As a result, Interstate pipe lines facing huge
take-or-pay liabilities (now in the billions) have tried to
make room for their take-or-pay gas by reducing their pur-
chases of lower-priced gas they contracted to buy under
contracts without take-or-pay clauses.
In effect, interstate pipe lines are attempting to shift the
risks of interstate gas markets away from their owners, cus-
tomers and high-priced take-or-pay suppliers, and onto their
low-priced suppliers.
Kansas producers in the Hugoton Field, the nation's
largest source of low-cost gas, entered into an inordinate
number of low-priced non-take-or-pay contracts years ago
when they were desperate for a market for their gas. Such
contracts bind the producers to sell only to their original
purchasers for the life of the contract, which in many cases is
for the productive life of the well involved.
As a consequence, many Kansas producers have had to
shut-in their wells or operate them below allowable levels
because their purchasers refuse to take their gas or to allow
them to seek other purchasers. Another consequence is that
overall demand for natural gas from the Hugoton Field has
declined significantly, making the Kansas economy accept a
larger portion of the risks of Interstate gas markets.
Other Hugoton producers sell gas under contracts with
more favorable terms largely because they contracted to sell
their gas to the Intrastate market, which was unregulated
prior to the enactment of the NGPA. These luckier producers
continue to have a market for their gas, and therefore operate
their wells at allowable levels.
As previously discussed, under the Kansas gas proration-
ing system, wells producing at their allowable levels may
drain gas from surrounding gas properties on which wells are
shut-in or operated at low production rates. This might be
occurring in the Hugoton Field, where some wells are either
shut-in or operated at low production rates to accommodate
the take-or-pay problems of interstate pipe lines. As a result,
Kansas not only is facing short-term revenue losses from the
reduction in demand for its gas, it also may be facing long-
term physical waste of its natural gas resources because of
unbalanced drainage patterns.
Kansas has few tools available for ending this intolerable
situation. Normal market incentives, which dictate that gas
purchasers prefer lower-priced gas over higher-priced gas,
have been rendered inoperative by improvident take-or-pay
contracts. Prior to 1963, Kansas would have used its common
purchaser and ratable take statutes to equalize the produc-
tion rates of all the wells in the Hugoton Field. It would have
directed those purchasers with high demands for gas to
make some of their gas purchases from the wells being
affected by the reduced takes of the Interstate pipe lines.
But, In 1963, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Northern
Natural Gas Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84, that
state common purchaser and ratable take statutes were
preempted as to their application to interstate pipe lines by
exclusive federal regulation of interstate pipe lines' gas
purchasing practices under the Natural Gas Act (NGA).
Subsequently, in 1986, the Court held in Transco that its
holding in Northern Natural remained in effect after the
passage of the NGPA.
With no other acceptable tool available, Kansas is attempt-
ing to use its gas prorationing system to shift the risks of
interstate gas markets back to the interstate pipe lines. It is
doing so in two ways. First, the KCC recently has been
estimating demand for natural gas from the Hugoton Field at
levels higher than it would have if it had given the low
nominations of the interstate pipe lines greater emphasis.
These higher demand estimates result in the setting of
higher allowables, and the higher allowables may cause
wells which operate at allowable levels to drain an increased
volume of gas from the properties on which wells are
operated below the allowable levels. To the extent this
indeed is occurring, Interstate pipe lines are suffering an
accelerated drainage of the reserves attributed to the wells
from which they purchase to wells which serve the Kansas
intrastate market.
Second, by changing its policy on reinstating underage,
the KCC has increased the possibility that wells serving the
interstate pipe lines will suffer a reduced ultimate recovery
unless the interstate pipe lines increase their purchases of
gas from such wells. This confronts the interstate pipe lines
with a Hobson's Choice: Either buy more Kansas gas now,
thereby helping to balance drainage patterns while incurring
higher short-term acquisition costs; or suffer an increased
possibility that the volume of their contractually assured
supplies of low-cost gas will be drained away, thereby driving
up their long-term cost structure and reducing their long-
term supply security.
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By appealing the KCC's new prorationing policy, North-
west has upped the possible economic consequences of this
game of economic chicken.
Read broadly, the rationale of the Northern Natural and
Transco decisions is that state conservation regulation is
federally preempted to the extent it reduces the flexibility of
interstate pipe lines and the FERC in their attempts to keep
down the costs of acquiring gas for interstate gas markets.
The theory of Northwest's appeal is that although the
Kansas prorationing system directly affects production activi-
ties rather than purchasing activities, it still negatively affects
Northwest's attempts to keep down its short-term and long-
term gas acquisition costs. Therefore, Northwest contends,
Kansas' prorationing system is preempted by federal regula-
tion to the extent that it permits gas reserves attributable to
the wells from which it purchases gas to be drained by other
wells in the Hugoton Field.
Should Northwest prevail on its theory, Kansas would be
forced to use its prorationing system essentially to protect
each gas property from being drained by wells located on
other gas properties. Such a result could force Kansas to
lower the production rate of most or all wells in the Hugoton
Field whenever an interstate pipe line reduced its purchases
from the Hugoton wells from which it contracted to buy gas.
Not to be outdone, an amicus curiae brief filed by several
natural gas-producing states argues that the Supreme Court
should use this case to reverse its holdings in Northern
Natural and Transco. This argument is based on legislative
history suggesting that Congress never intended the NGA to
preempt legitimate attempts of producing states to prevent
the physical waste of their natural gas resources or to protect
the correlative rights of their producers.
Moreover, the amici argue, because any state conservation
practice may affect the cost structures of interstate pipe lines,
the Court must reject the broader rationale of Northern
Natural and Transco if it wishes to leave the states with any
method for conserving their gas resources. Should this argu-
ment prevail, states could order other gas purchasers to take
gas from the wells serving interstate pipe lines if such takes
are necessary to equalize production rates within a common
reservoir. This could drastically complicate the already debil-
itating take-or-pay problems of the interstate pipe lines.
Obviously, the Court faces a difficult choice. Congress
certainly meant something when it gave the states exclusive
jurisdiction over natural gas production activities in Section 1
(b) of the NGA. Adopting Northwest's theory of the case
would render Section 1 (b) practically meaningless. On the
other hand, Congress could have legislatively reversed
Northern Naturalwhen it enacted the NGPA. This it did not
do. If the Court now reverses itself, not only will it provide a
rare example of the Court reversing its own legislative
interpretation, it could set in motion state action that would
undermine the long-term supply security of many interstate
pipe lines.
The Court does have one option that would not produce a
drastic impact on either the states or interstate pipe lines. It
could sustain the KCC underage reinstatement policy on the
narrow ground that it directly affects production activities
and therefore is distinguishable from the offending state
regulations in Northern Naturaland Transco.
This approach may be attractive in this case, since It is not
clear whether Kansas' underage reinstatement policy will
produce any long-term drainage of gas from the gas proper-
ties with wells serving interstate pipe lines. On the other
hand, exercising this option could be judged as an intellec-
tually unsatisfying example of putting form over substance,
especially since it is clear that the KCC hoped its new
underage reinstatement policy would force interstate pipe
lines to buy more gas from Kansas' Hugoton producers.
ARGUMENTS
For Northwest Central Pipeiine Corp. (Counsel of Record,
Harold L. Talisman, 1050 17th Street N. W., Suite 690,
Washington, D.C. 20036, telephone (202) 331-1194):
1. Kansas' underage reinstatement policy is preempted by
the NGA as applied to interstate natural gas companies.
2. Kansas' underage reinstatement policy impermissibly
burdens and discriminates against interstate commerce in
violation of the commerce clause.
For the State Caporaton Commission ofKansas (Coun-
sel of Record, Frank A Car Jr., 4th Floor, Docking State
Office Building Topeka, KS 66612; telephone (913) 296
3361):
1. Kansas' underage reinstatement policy is not preempted
by the NGA.
2. Kansas' underage reinstatement policy does not violate
the commerce clause.
AMICUS ARGUMENTS
In Support of the State Corporation Commision of
Kansas
Three separate briefs were filed on behalf of the KCC. The
U.S. Department ofJustice and the FERC filed a brief arguing
that the KCC's underage reinstatement policy does not
concern a field occupied by federal regulation under the
NGA, is not inconsistent with federal regulation under the
NGA, does not conflict with the FERC's authority over the
abandonment of interstate natural gas service, and consti-
tutes legitimate exercise of state authority in a manner that
produces only incidental effects on interstate commerce.
Several natural gas producing states (Texas, Louisiana,
New Mexico, North Dakota, and Oklahoma) filed a brief
which raises, in addition to the arguments raised by the
Justice Department and the FERC, an argument that the
Court should overturn its holding in Northern Natural and
Transco to avoid invalidating state conservation actions, all
of which affect prices of natural gas in interstate markets.
Finally, a brief containing arguments parallel to those
above was filed jointly by the Council of State Governments,
the International City Management Association, the National
Association of Counties, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, and
the National League of Cities.
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